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Homeland Security Technologies

GuardianBlue Event Detection System

Overview:

The first and only contaminant warning system system certified and designated by the US Department of Homeland Security for monitoring drinking water.

Leverage the power of the Agent Library.   Equipped with the unique, proprietary agent library, the GuardianBlue Event Detection System is able to detect and classify the 34 contaminants of greatest concern to drinking water suppliers and USEPA.  The system detects water quality events within minutes and reports the contaminant matched in the agent library – easily differentiating between fluoride overfeed, pesticide contamination, cyanide and warfare agents.

Quickly learn common water quality events.  GuardianBlue Event Detection System is also equipped with the ability to learn water quality events unique to the water being monitored.  Users label the learned events, and assign a priority level, empowering the GuardianBlue to log and alert users to new and recurring events.

GuardianBlue is the first and only Early Warning System for drinking water to earn SAFETY Act designation and certification from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “Designation” means the product has qualified as an anti-terrorist technology, while “certification” means the product is approved for homeland security.  GuardianBlue’s Event Monitor, Water Panel and TOC Analyzer have undergone Environmental Technology Verification from the EPA for continuous multiparameter water monitoring in distribution systems.  Hach’s GuardianBlue Early Warning System alarmed on 100% of all contaminants injected into the system during ETV verification. For a full report, go to www.hachhst.com and download the ETV summary.

The Components of the GuardianBlue System

Event Monitor

The Event Monitor analyzes sensor data from the Water Panel and the TOC Analyzer. Every 60 seconds the system applies a patented algorithm to the sensor measurements, calculating a site’s water quality baseline. The system alarms when the trigger signal exceeds a user-set threshold, indicating a water quality “event.” The event fingerprint is compared to fingerprints stored in both the Agent Library and the Plant Library, and alerts utility managers when a match is found. If no match is found, utility operators are alerted to an unknown deviation in water quality and the event’s fingerprint is stored in the Plant Library for further analysis, identification and classification.

Agent Library

Located within the Event Monitor, the Agent Library is the most technologically advanced analytics software available for water quality monitoring. The Agent Library contains fingerprints for a wide variety of threat contaminants. When the Agent Library matches an event with the fingerprint of a threat contaminant it also provides the degree of confidence in the classification to help operators make appropriate response decisions.

Water Panel

The Water Panel continuously monitors free or total chlorine, conductivity, pH, turbidity, temperature and pressure which it sends to the Event Monitor via digital transmission. When an event occurs, the Water Panel detects changes in the water quality parameters. The Water Panel is comprised of Hach’s leading water quality sensors and has become an industry standard for water quality monitoring.

TOC Analyzer

The TOC Analyzer continuously monitors total organic carbon. The TOC Analyzer uses EPA method 415.1 to obtain its measurements ensuring accurate results. The TOC Analyzer is a key component of GuardianBlue, providing increased sensitivity to organic contaminants.

Automatic Sampler

When the Event Monitor triggers, it instantly signals the Automatic Sampler to capture a real-time water sample. This allows water utilities to conduct additional forensic analysis and testing on actual water samples as part of a response plan.

How GuardianBlue Works

Step 1:

GuardianBlue’s Event Monitor analyzes five commonly measured water quality parameters sent from its Water Panel and TOC Analyzer:

  • Chlorine(free or total)
  • pH
  • Turbidity
  • Conductivity
  • Total organic carbon

These parameters enable GuardianBlue to calculate a water distribution system’s operating baseline – water quality under normal operating conditions.

Step 2:

Every 60 seconds the system analyzes sensor data and calculates the trigger signal, which indicates a deviation from the water quality baseline. If significant deviations occur, the trigger signal alarms operators in real-time.

Step 3:

Once the deviation has been detected, the Event Monitor instantly signals the Automatic Sampler to capture a real-time water sample at designated monitoring locations. The system then analyzes both the Agent Library and Plant Library to assess and classify the deviation.

The Agent Library contains fingerprints for a wide variety of threat contaminants, ranging from VX and ricin to arsenic and herbicides. A subscription service is available offering continual updates with the latest contaminant fingerprints developed by Hach HST.

The Plant Library contains fingerprints for operational and naturally occurring events to each unique water distribution system. This capability allows water utilities to detect, alert, classify and learn real-world events such as water main breaks, switching water sources, and caustic overfeeds.

Step 4:

If no match is found in either library, the event fingerprint is stored in the Plant Library for future reference. Water utility operators can identify unknown event fingerprints and assign a severity level, allowing recognition of previous events and decreasing the frequency of unknown events.

Real life Examples of Water Security Contamination Events:

The vulnerability of the drinking water distribution systems to accidental or deliberate contamination due to a backflow event is becoming a well-recognized possibility. The variety of potential threats and the innumerable access points make this a difficult scenario to defend against. This was clearly stated in a GAO report to Congress that listed the vulnerability of the distribution system to attack as the largest security risk to water supplies. A system designed to address the problem of distribution system monitoring is described here. The developed system employs an array of common analytical instrumentation coupled with advanced interpretive algorithms to provide detection/identification-response networks that are capable of enhancing system security. A variety of real world venues and testing protocols were used to verify the efficacy of the system. The system is shown to be a practical measure to help detect and characterize backflow events, thus countering terrorist activities.

Attack using induced backflow is not just a theoretical threat; such events have occurred and others have been thwarted in the planning stages.

Year Description of Incident
1968 Yippies threaten the Democratic National Convention with plans to dump LSD into water supplies.
1970 Plans by the radical Weathermen to steal biological weapons from Ft. Detrick, Maryland to contaminate a major water supply are exposed.
1972 A plot by ecoterrorist group R.I.S.E. to poison urban water supplies around Chicago.
1977 North Carolina reservoir sabotaged with poisonous chemicals.
1979 Two separate incidents of chemical poisoning cause 2,008 illnesses in Virginia and Oregon.
1980 Attempted extortion of a Lake Tahoe casino with threat to poison water.
1980 Water mains in Pittsburgh deliberately contaminated with weed killer
1983 After threats to poison water supply in Louisiana traces of cyanide found.
1983 Israel uncovers Israeli Arab plot to poison Galilee water with “an unidentified powder
1985 Plutonium discovered in New York City’s drinking water after a threat o contaminate the water supply.
1987 In the Philippines, 19 died and about 140 are hospitalized after accepting water and sweets from unknown persons
1990’s US government was plagued by series of creditable threats of a looming VX attack on the water supplies of the Nation’s Capital.  These threats were taken seriously enough that the government commissioned and funded research into a dedicated on-line VX detector.  Several were deployed.
1991 There was an anonymous letter sent to the officials of Kelowna, British Columbia.  The letter threatened the city’s water supplies with biological contaminants.  The motive was associated with the Gulf War.
1992 An attack against the Turkish Air Force base in Istanbul.  The water tanks on the base were found to contain potassium cyanide (50 mg/L).  The Kurdish Peoples Workers’ Party (PPK) were responsible.
1993 A meeting of Islamic Fundamentalist groups occurred in Tehran, Iran.  At this meeting, one of the proposals discussed was the idea of poisoning the water supplies of major cities in the west.
1994 A Moldavian General threatened to contaminate the water supply of the Russian 14th Army Group with mercury.  After his dismissal, the mercury was not recovered.
1999 Three threatening letters were received by public figures in  Britian. The letters demanded the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland by 16 June. The author, Adam Busby, threatened to poison the United Kingdom’s water supply with the herbicidal weed killer Paraquat if the British government did not comply with his demand
1999 Two juveniles were responsible for pouring a “bright red substance” into the water supply of the town of Grass Valley, California.  The water treatment plant was forced to shut down causing a denial of service to the areas 2,300 residents
2000 It was reported that Chechen rebels planned to poison unknown water sources in Chechnya, Russia.
2000 A man was arrested for attempting to poison the water supply of a village in Turkey with insecticide.
2000 A condominium block in Singapore discovered that the water had been poisoned with kerosene and turpentine
2001 In British Columbia, a reservoir hatch was found open and an oily substance on the surface of the water.  The 6,400 residents of Ladysmith were warned not to drink the water until the system could be flushed.
2001 In the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf threatened to poison the water supply of the town of Isabella.  About a week later, the water supply is cut off when residents complain of a gasoline taste and odor in the water.  Abu Sayyaf is blamed
2002 Al Qaeda arrested with plans to attack U.S. embassy water in Rome with “cyanide”.
2002 Federal officials arrest two Al Qaeda suspects in Denver with documents about how to poison the country’s water.
2002 Al Qaeda operatives arrested with plans to attack water networks surrounding the Eiffel Tower neighborhoods in Paris
2003 Jordan foils Iraqi plot to poison drinking water supplies from Zarqa feeding U.S. bases along the Eastern desert.
2003 FBI bulletin warns of Al Qaeda plans found in Afghanistan to poison U.S. food and water supplies
2003 A vial containing Ricin is found in a SC postal facility.  Accompanying the vial is a note stating that the city’s water supply will be contaminated unless certain demands are met.  Subsequent testing reveals no Ricin in the water.
2004 In China, a man is arrested after dumping insecticide into a reservoir.  64 people were ill and 42 were hospitalized after the exposure.  The man was a seller of water purification devices, and his motive was to increase sales
2004 A Sudanese man with Iranian intelligence contacts is captured carrying a very powerful poison in Iraq.  The man was reportedly preparing to poison the water supply of Diwaniyah a city 100 miles south of Baghdad
2004 The FBI and Department of Homeland Security issue a bulletin warning that terrorists were trying to recruit workers in water plants as part of a plan to poison drinking water at the treatment plants
2005 Russian authorities, during a visit by President Bush, recovered liquid cyanide and other unidentified poisons intended for use by terrorists.  The Russian Federal Security Services said, “The use of these strong acting poisons in small doses in highly populated areas, in key installations and in reservoirs could have caused large numbers of victims.”
2005 In an attempt to disrupt the second round of Iraqi elections in December, rumors swept Baghdad on Dec. 15 that the water supply had been poisoned only hours before polls were to open for national parliamentary elections.  Residents were awakened at 1 a.m. when warnings about drinking water were broadcast through mosque loudspeakers.  According to the article, the country’s health minister, Abdel Mutalib Mohammed, issued a statement on television saying that there were no cases of poison in the water system and that the news was untrue

Dual Use value from Security Monitoring

In the past, monitoring of operational parameters in the distribution system has been done in a piecemeal and haphazard manner. The distribution system represents the last analytical frontier in the water quality industry. The monitoring of source water and treatment plant processes has progressed to a level at which we can be confident that we are providing good quality water. Once the water reaches our aging distribution systems, our knowledge as to its continued integrity is limited by the quality and amount of available data. Most monitoring in the distribution system is relegated to the occasional snapshot provided by grab sampling for a few limited parameters or the infrequent regulatory testing required by mandates such as the Total Coliform Rule. The development of water security monitoring in the years since 9/11 has the potential to change this paradigm. Since 9/11 numerous communities have installed multi-parameter monitoring stations in various locations throughout the distribution system as early warning systems based on potential water security threats. These continuous on-line systems have recorded large streams of data (some sites for a number of years) relevant to water quality in the distribution systems in which they have been deployed. In this study data streams from a number of communities (both small and large) are analyzed for pertinent information as to the health and operation of the distribution system. Changes in water quality are correlated with known causes attributable to day-to-day operational changes (source water switching, chlorine shocking, pumps turning on and off, pressure surges) and also anomalous events (pipe bursts, accidental back flows, cross connections, chemical over feeds, treatment plant problems, nitrification events, etc.). Information concerning what if any action was taken to ameliorate the problem will also be linked to the data for the identified events. The data streams also show the diversity in what could be termed “normal” operating conditions both within and between different classes and types of systems. This sort of information is critical in understanding and improving the operation of our distribution systems and can also be valuable as we consider regulations that effect that operation. The current effort to update the Total Coliform Rule as well as any future efforts to regulate the distribution system will need to consider databases such as this before we determine the best course of action to ensure our public water supplies meet acceptable levels of quality and safety from source to tap.

Real-Life examples of Water quality events detected with GuardianBlue or Hach’s other distribution monitoring solutions.

  1. On March 26th, 2007, maintenance was performed at the Plant. After maintenance was completed, the plant was restarted and the system that feeds the ammonia overfed the chemical. The operator noticed an increase in pH and contacted operations at 16:25. Operations reported a problem with the ammonia feed pumps. The problem was temporarily fixed but a slug of ammonia was sent into the distribution system. Several customers called, complaining about an ammonia smell and taste coming from the tap. The exact amount of ammonia released was unknown, but was believed to be less than 10 ppm. The facility continued operation but temporarily utilizing free chlorine as a disinfectant until July 2nd.
  2. Road work near a distribution line dislodged biomass and other particulate matter from the lining of the pipe. There was a massive increase in turbidity, which not only showed up on the turbidimeter, but also showed up as an interference in the chlorine measurement (optical ). As expected, the conductivity and pH also showed minor changes. The increase in biomass in the water was indicated by the TOC analyzer. This event illustrates the ability of the Event Monitor to detect and alarm on unanticipated events. This event also provides a signature for the materials adhering to the walls of the pipes in this location.
  3. PipeBreak # 1 The break occurred on June 29th. The pipe was an 8” line and located 1.8 miles away from the WDMP. There was an increase in turbidity and chlorine. Turbidity appears to have increased the day before the break.
  4. PipeBreak # 2 Did you know the GuardianBlue system alarmed almost three full days before a catastrophic pipeburst and has detected pipeburst events in many major US cities? It’s true, using its’ unique algorthim with regularly monitored parameters, GuardianBlue saw a change in both conductivity and chlorine at the same time. Normally these particular changes are considered small enough and are not detected by the human eye, but the algorithm caught the deviation and started alarming about 70 hours before a 36″ main broke, spilling millions of gallons of water into downtown. The pipe had a small crack, which is why the conductivity and chlorine changed, due to decreased water age. About 3 days later, the catastrophic break occurred. The instrumentation was 2 miles upstream from the break. This particular municipality can name this event in the Plant Library, and should it see a similar fingerprint, the event monitor would recall the name given in the Plant Library. The EPA estimates the average pipebreak costs about $29 million dollars in repair and lost revenue.
  5. In one Northern Midwest system, every Friday, the sensors would behave extremely erratically resulting in multiple alarm signals being generated. Investigations led to the discovery of extreme amounts of entrained air bubbles being present in the systems water on Friday afternoons and evenings.
    Further investigation revealed that school buildings that were to be vacant over the weekend had a policy of using air to blow out their water lines to prevent freezing so that the heat could be turned off over the weekend. A faulty check valve at one of the schools allowed the air to bleed into the distribution system. The valve was replaced, thus closing a possible backflow route into the system. After this the erratic readings ceased.
  6. Consumer Complaints: A drinking water facility on a military base kept getting phone calls from consumers of their water who were complaining of a funny taste and odor. Each time a complaint was called in, a drinking water plant operator would drive to a water sampling point in the distribution system and test the water.  After several unsuccessful attempts at trying to figure out the cause of the odd water and persistent complaints, a series of water distribution monitoring devices were purchased and installed. These devices monitored the water quality on a continuous basis and therefore made it easier to respond and correlate the poor water quality to the complaints. They discovered low flow areas and dead heads within the distribution system. With this new information in hand, the plant operators optimized their flushing schedule and greatly improved the water quality resulting in no more complaining phone calls.
  7. Grab Sample vs On Line Case Study: Customer performed extensive grab sampling and believed water quality to meet all of their standards, and the water quality did meet the standards during the grab sampling tests.  They installed several WDMPs at key locations around the city and found turbidity spiked to 20 NTU at night and high variability of Cl2 levels. The municipality changed their processes to minimize spike to about 1.5 NTU at night.  Result: Improved Water Quality and Consistency
  8. Water Mapping Case Study: This municipality has many WDMPs out in their distribution system. Three water plants serve the area, mixing water from all three plants.  They discovered conductivity is a valuable parameter to trace where water is going and aid in hydraulic mapping. This municipality also used the chlorine readings for the reporting purposes. Understanding your hydraulic map offers many benefits such as scheduling repairs, planning for growth and identification of system deficiencies. From another point of view, one can predict where the ‘bad’ water is moving to and what populations it will affect first.
  9. Operational Mistake Case Study Customer received incorrect concentration of caustic chemical to feed and did not notice.  Added usual amount to distribution system resulting in caustic overfeed WDMP with Event Monitor alarmed – notifying customer of adverse conditions Corrective actions put in place to prevent future operational mistakes of this kind Result: Improved Water Quality
  10. Fluoride overfeed caught in real-time.  The water distribution system can be vulnerable to accidental exposure to unwanted water quality events. In this real-life scenario, the water utility was forced to revert to the utilization of a different water treatment plant while maintenance was being done to the new plant. A pump responsible for dosing fluoride into the treated water malfunctioned causing the dose to increase over time.  When the overdose occurred, the GuardianBlue Early Warning System not only alarmed but also classified the likely cause of the problem to be a fluoride overfeed. This allowed a rapid response before consumers of water were exposed to potentially dangerous levels of fluoride. Fluoride, while toxic at moderate to high doses, is generally considered beneficial for dental health at low doses. The most commonly recommended dosage of fluoride for humans is 1 mg per day.

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